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The Deluge of Norms* 
by Andreas Heldrich** 
I. GROWTH CRISIS OF THE LEGAL ORDER? 
Max Horkheimer once remarked that freedom and justice were dialectical 
concepts: the more freedom, the less justice; the more justice, the less freedom. 
The incompatibility suggested by this slogan-like formula finds eloquent expres-
sion in contemporary discussions of the fundamentals of legal policy. The 
development of the social constitutional state1 in the Federal Republic of Ger-
• This article was originally published in German as Normuberftutung in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT (1981). Translator's footnotes are printed in italics and enclosed in brackets . 
•• Professor of Law, Institute for International Law, University of Munich, Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
1. [The following discussion relies largely on G. DAIII1, DEUTSCHES RECIIT 299-302 (2d ed. 1963) 
[hereinafter cited as DAIi 11]. 
According to Art. 20 of the Basic Law (see note 18, infra), the German Federal Republic is a "democratic and 
social federal state." Grundgesetz [Basic Law] fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland of May 23, 1949, Buv-
DESGESET/BL4TT [BGBL] I, I [GG]. Article 28(1)(1) GG requires that the constitutional order in the Lander 
conform to the fundamental principles of a "republican, democratic and social Rechtstaat." The combination of these 
two articles makes the Federal Republic a "social Rechtstaat," a term which is difficult to translate, and which cannot 
be understood without reference to its constituent parts. 
The term "Rechtstaat" has a long history. As a translation, "constitutional state" may serve as a shorthand, but "a 
stnte based upon the rule of law" is closer to the sense of the German. See N. JOHNSON, GOVERNMENT IN THE 
FEDER.4L REPUBLIC OF GER I1AVY 12 (1973) [hereinafter cited asjOIlVSOV]' The term "Recht" encompasses the 
idea of "justice" as well as "law." In the broadest, and earliest, sense, then, a "Rechtstaat" was a state which, in 
contrast to a totnlitarian one, sought justice and fairness above all. By the nineteenth century, however, the word had 
come to be used in a narrower sense to designate a state in which the state itself was bound to obey certnin iRgal norms. 
When these iRgal norms are procedural only, the formal Rechtstaat exists. The bases of the formal Rechtstaat are 
separation of powers, administration in accordance with laws, and independent court. Articles 19, 20 and 92 GG 
guarantee that the Federal Republic is a formal Rechtstaat. 
The formal Rechtstaat may be preserved, however, even when the state promulgates arbitrary laws. It is here that 
the substantive idea of the Rechtstaat emerges. The substantive Rechtstaat looks not merely at the way laws are 
promulgated and administered, but has the freedom of the individual citizen as its goal. In this sense, the Rechtstaat 
presupposes the existence of fundamental and inviolable norms which the state must observe vis-a-vis its citizens. The 
idea of the substantive Rechstaat enters the Basic Law in the enumeration offundamental rights [Grundrechte] in 
Articles 1-19 GG. Thus the Federal Republic is a Rechtstaat in both the formal and substantive senses. 
As noted above, the German Federal Republic is also a social state [Sozialstaat]. The exact content of this term is 
somewhat unclear, but it certainly includes such guarantees as equality of classes and professions, social justice, and 
the provision of help for those in need. The central meaning of the "social" in the Basic Law is that the stnte is thereby 
bound to "social activism." See Decision of December 19, 1951, I Bundesverfassunsgericht [BVERFG] 105. In 
addition, the clause makes clear that the basic law and other laws must, in doubtful cases, be construed "in accordance 
with the requirements of a social state." DAHI1, supra at 301. 
The ideas of the Rechtstaat and the Sozialstaat have sometimes been regarded as irreconcilable, and, in fact, the 
view that each takes of the individual is fundamentally different. The Rechtstaat, as an outgrowth of the bourgeois-
liberal thought of the nineteenth century, sees the self-sufficient individual as central. The Sozialstaat, born out of the 
problems of industrialized society, sees individuals as in need of aid which only the social order can provide. The 
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many has apparently reached a point at which the public views legislative ad-
vances less and less as steps toward the achievement of justice and more and 
more strongly as dangers to freedom. Symptomatic of this is the widespread 
discontent with the wave of statutes that has broken over our society.2 
Lamentation over legislation is, per se, as old as legislation itself. Tacitus 
connects the number of laws with the moral decline of the Roman state: " ... et 
corruptissima re publica plurimae leges."3 The restriction of freedom affected 
by laws was apparently a commonplace oflegal criticism in the classical period.4 
To be sure, the accent then lay on the negative effects of legislation on the 
lawyer's freedom of action. 5 A tradition-bound and proud profession whose goal 
is the attainment of practical justice through cautious development of the inher-
ited body of law easily sees legislative intervention as interference. From this 
point of view, codification seems an unnatural break in an organic process.6 It is 
no coincidence that even in our own time lawyers are the loudest objectors to the 
flood of statutes. In the meantime, doubts as to the value of continued expansion 
of the legal order have seized even those politicians active in legislation. 7 
Rechtstaat idea "seek< to protect the individual from the state; that of the Sozialstaat seek< to protect him through the 
state. One seek< to reduce government activity to a minimum . .. the other to increase it through state care and 
planning." DAHM, supra at 302. 
The Basic Law requires nevertheless that both ideas of the state be meshed. The type of state envisaged seems to be 
one 'Jounded on the rule of law in which social and economic rights as well as the concomitant responsibilities of 
government are recognized." jOHVSOV, supra at 28. The social Rechtstaat is, thus, a restrained welfare state in 
which the idea of the Rechtstaat and that of the Sozialstaat mutually limit one another.) 
2. See particularly Zweigert, DU rechtstaatliche Dimension von Gesetzgebung und judikatur, in VER-
HANDLUNGEN DES 51. DEUTSCH EN ]URISTENTAGES, K 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zweigert); See also, 
Berner,Inflation im Recht, 1978 BAyVBL 617 [hereinafter cited as Berner); H. HONSELL, YOM HEUTIGEN 
STIL DER GESETZGEBUNG (1979) [hereinafter cited as HONSELL); Maassen, Die Freiheit des Burgers in einer 
Zeit ausufernder Gesetzgebung, 1979 NEUE ]URISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIIT [N]W] 1473 [hereinafter cited as 
Maassen); MAYER-MALY, RECHTSKENNTNIS UND GESETZESFLUT (1969) [hereinafter-cited as MAYER-
MALY); S. SIMITIS INFORMATIONSKRISE DES RECHTS UND DATENVERARBEITUNG (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as SIMITIS); Starck, UbermajJ an Rechtstaat?, 1979 ZEITSCHRIIT FUR RECHTSPOLITIK [Z.F. RPOL.) 209 
[hereinafter cited as Starck); Vogel, Zur Diskussion um die Normenflut 1979 ]URISTENZEITUNG 321 [here-
inafter cited as Vogel); WeiB, Verrechtlichung als Selbstgefiihrdung des Rechts, 1978 DIE OFFENTLICHE 
VERW ALTUNG 601 [hereinafter cited as WeiB). [The word here translated as statute, Gesetz, means written law; 
the term is used in a broad sense to encompass constitutions, federal statutes, statutes of the Lander and regulations. 
DAHM, supra note I, at 35. The term does not include decisions of the courts or customary law. See also,]. 
BAUMANN, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 36-37 (6th ed. 1980)). 
3. Annals 3.27.3, cited according to NORR, RECHTSKRITIK IN DER ROMISCHEN ANTIKE 64 n.14 (1974) 
["Laws were most numerous when the commonwealth was most corrupt." Annals 3.27, in THE CO IfPLETE WORKS 
OF TACITUS (M. Hadas ed. 1942)); see also the sources cited there on the "Topos" of the flood of norms; 
also see Gagner, STUDIEN ZUR IDEENGESCHICHTE DER GESETZGEBUNG 29 (1960). 
4. See HONSELL, supra note 2, at 5. 
5. On this point, see KASER, ZUR METHODE DER ROMISCHEN RECHTSFINDUNG 75 (1962): "Roman 
lawyers will, therefore, have thought less of written law, as we today do, as the core of their legal order, 
and viewed it more often as a barrier limiting the freedom of legal decisionmaking." Id. 
6. This is the position Savigny took in the famous polemic "Vom Beruf un serer Zeit fUr 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft," (1814). See also F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER 
NEUZEIT 391 (1967). 
7. Cf. the references in Vogel, supra note 2, at 321 n. 1-2; Maassen,supra note 2, at 1473; and Honsell, 
supra note 2, at n.17. 
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II. NORMS OVERFLOWING 
In fact, the production of norms in our society seems to have reached a 
hitherto nonexistent scale. Above all, the number of statutes and legal regula-
tions is apparently growing exponentially. The Federal Minister of Justice re-
cently reported on this in graphic detail. s Thus, for example, the bulk of the 
Federal Statutory Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] (parts I and II) has, in the three 
decades from 1950-59, 1960-69 and 1970-79 swollen from 15 volumes, to 21 
volumes, to 44 volumes. 9 The amount of legal material finding its way into print 
in a single year today is, in terms of quantity, equal to the production of statutes 
and regulations it took an entire decade to produce 100 years ago. Even with this 
background, the absolute number of Federal German statutes (1480) and regula-
tions (2280), a total of about 90,000 paragraphs in force 1o as of February 18, 
1977, is not yet a cause for anxiety. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. The 
number of valid state statutes and regulations is, without doubt, far greater. In 
this area there is substantial conflict of laws, resulting from the differing legal, 
geographical and historical origins of the individual federal states. In addition, 
there is the extraordinarily intense legislative activity of the European Commu-
nity, as laid down in the Community'S Official Gazette. From a purely quantitative 
point of view, the bulk of currently valid secondary community law does not lag far 
behind that of German federal law. This perspective is really skewed, however, 
since it ignores the relatively limited technical importance of this mass of laws 
which applies, for the most part, only to narrowly defined special areas and is 
hardly evident in general legal practice. 
A realistic assessment of currently valid legal provisions cannot stop with a 
complete description of laws and regulations now in force, after the model of the 
revised collections of state and federal provisions. In the area of public law, 
particularly, the facts of legal life are largely determined by administratively 
promulgated administrative rules. The innumerable directives, circulars, in-
structions, memoranda, administrative orders and ministerial orders in the tax 
field should make clear how large the independent share of this "self-made 
administrative law" can be. The practical consequences of this almost opaque 
web of norms are scarcely slighter than those of the "laws" as more narrowly 
defined. 
Finally, a true picture of the realities of our legal life cannot disregard the 
norm-making power of case law. In fact a substantial part of our legal order 
8. Vogel, supra note 2, at 321. Cf Zweigert.supra note 2, at K6; SIMITlS,SUpra note 2, at 12; Berner, 
supra note 2, at 617; MAYER-MALY, supra note 2, at 13 (also dealing with developments in Austria). 
9. An expansion of the content of the law cannot, to be sure, be inferred from the size of the Federal 
Statutory Gazette alone. The republication of basically unchanged statutes, as well as of statutory 
appendices such as tables and charts, takes up a great deal of room. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 322. 
10. !d. at 321, with reference to Bundestagsdrucklache 81212 at 3. 
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consists of the precedents from judicial decisions. A glance into the legal com-
mentaries will suffice to demonstrate the norm-creating achievements of the 
courts. In addition, the technique of setting out a syllabus by the court makes 
clear the general rules that issue from the cases. The courts have actually stepped 
into the shoes of the legislature, primarily by making general clauses more 
concrete, but also by conforming inadequate or antiquated regulations to the 
necessities of the present in such areas as the development of products liability, 
or the further evolution of the rights of the individual worker,u But even the 
case law 12 that has developed in this manner is - by its very nature - always 
growing. The total number of cases decided has also been increasing year by 
year, along with the number of judgeships. The situation varies, however, from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from court to court. 13 But the number of deci-
sions being published is apparently rising along with the total number of cases 
decided. To be sure, the volume of published decisions by the highest courts has 
remained, all in all, relatively constant, as the rate of publication of the two 
official collections of decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof'4 shows. The lower 
courts, on the other hand, seem to get more publication-happy year by year. 
Altogether, then, an imposing, not to say threatening, mass of material has 
collected in our legal order. There can be no doubt, too, that working with this 
pile of norms places the lawyer in an almost impossible position.' 5 We need not 
11. For the prob1ematics of this development see, e.g., FISCHER, DIE WEITERBILDUNG DES REcHTS 
DURCH DIE REcHTsPRECHUNG (1971); Heidrich, Hochstrichterliche Rechtsprechung als Triebfeder soziakn 
Wandels, 1972JBRSozRTHEORIE 305, 339; BADURA, GRENZEN UND MOGLICHKEITEN DES RICHTERRECHTS 
(Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Sozialgerichtsverbandes, v. 10) 40 (1973); DIEDERICHSEN, DIE FLUCHT 
DES GESETZGEBERS AUS DER POLITISCHEN VERANTWORTUNG 1M ZIVILRECHT (H17 4). 
12. [In English in the original.] 
13. See tables 15.4, Business of the Courts, in STATISTISCHES ]AHRBUCH FCR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND [STAT. J B] 321 (1979). There is a clear increase in the number of decisions on appeal in 
the civil courts of first instance [Landgerichte] (1975: 20,048; 1976: 30,835; 1977: 34,933), in decisions of 
the local courts with regard to punishable offenses (1975: 387,322; 1976: 405,905; 1977: 415,409), in 
decisions of the Social Insurance Tribunals (1975: 37,833; 1976: 40,882; 1977: 42,396) and in settle-
ments through the administrative courts (1975: 47,055; 1976: 52,412; 1977: 60,337). Declines in certain 
figures, as for examples the clear decrease in the number of initial decisions by the civil courts of first 
instance, are probably to be explained primarily by changes in legal procedure - here the division of 
jurisdiction between the local courts [Amtsgerichte] and the civil courts of first instance [Landgerichte], 
["Until January I, 1975 Amtsgerichte had been restricted to cases in which the amount in controversy had been DM 
1,000 and then DM 1,500," A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM [hereinafter cited as 
VON MEHREN] 129 n.169 (2d ed. 1977). This amount has increased to DM 3,000. "It was estimated that the 
increase would reduce the Landgericht case load by 33% overall and by 50% in traffic accident cases." 1d., citing 
Putzo, Aktuelle Anderungen des Zivilprozessrechtts zum 1, 1, 1975,1975 NJW 185.] 
14. [The Bundesgerichtshof is "at the summit of the system of regular courts." von Mehren, supra note 13 at 
130. For a discussion of the German court system, see id. at 126-134.] 
15. The admission made by the Federal Minister of Justice during a budget debate in Parliament is 
characteristic: "It is really hard to understand that a country such as ours cannot answer the question: 
'What is the law in force' at almost any point with any certainty. You have indices. You can search 
laboriously through them. But the question: What is in force from A to Z not even the Ministry of 
Justice can answer today, let alone a department, and they know nothing at all of what is in force in the 
States (Lander) and Municipalities." Quoted in Maassen, supra note 2, at 1473. 
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resolve for the time being whether Spiros Simitis' recommendation for the use of 
electronic data processing provides a suitable method for mastering this "legal 
information crisis." The automated documentation of federal law, now in prep-
aration, is surely desirable. 16 Similar initiatives should begin at the state level. But 
extending the storage of data to court decisions and legal literature would not be 
without its problems. There is much to be said for the proposition that the 
administration of justice would, in fact, collapse if every lawyer were continually 
confronted by every relevant bit of information on the state of the law. It is 
possible that a screening out of a portion of the pertinent information is the price 
to be paid if cases are to be settled within a reasonable amount of time. Conscious 
selection based on quality would, of course, be preferable to widely practiced 
screening based on ignorance. This problem could be solved by complete and 
always available documentation of all legal matter, in the broadest sense. But the 
pressure that would develop actually to view and sift the available profusion of 
material would consume a great deal of working time. 
III. CAUSES OF THE FLOOD OF NORMS 
A therapy based on cause, one that would attack the evil at its roots, would, 
therefore, need to have a reduction of the flood of norms itself as its goal. It 
appears doubtful, however, whether this can be tried with any prospect of 
success. More closely observed, the continuing expansion of the law is an almost 
necessary consequence of both our constitutional order and the level of devel-
opment of our society. 17 
(1) The Basic Lawls itself demands the broad promulgation of laws designed 
to fulfill the tasks of the state. 19 This can be clarified by a catch-phrase: the 
principle of a state based on law20 demands that state action in justice and 
administration proceed according to formal statutes. As a consequence, Parlia-
ment must issue the basic rules governing important questions in the form of 
statutes. Restriction of the basic rights based on a special legal proviso also 
requires an act of legislation. Above all, the dynamics of equal protection push 
toward continued evolution of the laws in order to guarantee equal treatment in 
16. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 325. Maassen supra note 2. at 1476 is in agreement as is Starck. supra 
note 2, at 213. 
17. With regard to the following, see Vogel, supra note 2, at 322; Noll, Die Normativitiit als rechtsan-
thropologisches Grundphiinomen, in FESTSCHRIFT ENGISCH 125, 135 (1969); Zweigert, supra note 2. at K8; 
Hug. Gesetzesftut und Rechtsetzungslehre, in GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR RODiG 3 (1978). 
18. [The Grundgesetz or Basic Law of May 23, 1949, wasfirst thought of only as a transitional statute which 
was to remain in force only until the German people could "freely choose a constitution." GG Art. 146. "In reality, the 
Basic Law determines the use of state power within the German Federal Republic just as any other constitution does." 
DAHW, supra note 1, at 274.] 
19. For more on this point, see Starck, supra note 2, at 211. To be sure, the constitutional framework 
leaves enough room for a reduction of the production of statutes. See Maassen, supra note 2. at 1476. 
20. [See the discussion of the Rechtsstaat, note 1 supra.] 
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equal situations. A comparable result follows from the constitutional principle of 
proportionality, which compels the legislature to differentiate among its mea-
sures so as to avoid unduly heavy interference in certain types of cases.21 On 
several occasions, the Federal Constitutional Court22 has also instructed the 
legislature to carry out needed legal reforms.23 
(2) The inner organization of the state itself promotes the tendency to formu-
late political decisions in the form of legal regulations. The entire apparatus of 
the judicial system and of administration is available to enforce the law. For this 
very reason, the promulgation of legal regulations has become the most impor-
tant instrument for the realization of political goals. One could, of course, 
imagine other means for translating such goals into action, by attempting, for 
example, to win the public over to a particular position by use of the mass media. 
How little such extra-legal attempts at persuasion produce can be seen from the 
example of the federal government's calls for energy conservation. Apparently 
our state can only influence the attitude of its citizens effectively and lastingly 
with the help of the law and the organizations which enforce it. In this respect, 
an equally successful alternative to legislation is not in sight. 
(3) In a certain way, the mere fact that legal rules exist creates an automatic 
need for more legal regulation. Above all, laws that are poorly drafted, too 
detailed or insufficiently thought out demand renewed legislative action.24 But 
changes in social and economic conditions also create a permanent compulsion 
to alter legislation accordingly. And the more the legislature attempts to deal 
with the multiplicity oflife situations, the more the law it makes becomes casuistic 
and unclear, a perfect breeding ground for those seeking absurdities, or viola-
tions of the principle of equal protection, which then demand legislative correc-
tion once again.25 The lawmaking process thus displays its own dynamic which, 
once in motion, can scarcely ever be brought to a halt. 
The necessity for constant change of the existing legal order also arises from 
the practical consequences of international entanglements. Above all, the fact 
that our country is part of the European Community has meant legislative 
efforts to conform the laws.26 
21. For more on this point, see Starck, supra note 2, at 211. 
22. [The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) sits as the "guardian of the Constitution 
[Basic Law]." DAHM, supra note 1 at 288; see Decision of March 20,1952,1 BVERFG 195. Together with the 
administrative courts, the Constitutional Court guarantees full court supervision of the government's use of power, .:is 
required by Art. 19 GG. The court has the power ofjudicilll review, and can set aside legislation incompatible with the 
Basic Law. See, VON MEHREN, supra note 13, at 137-141.] 
23. [For example, the last paragraph of Art. 6 GG contained an injunction to the legislature: "illegitimate 
children shall, through legislation, be given the same conditions for their physical and spiritual development as 
legitimate children." When after several years no such legislation was forthcoming, the courts were ordered to ignore 
legislation inforce if it conflicted with the Basic Law. Decision of Jan. 29, 1969,25 BVERFG 167. The legislature 
then acted promptly. (August 19, 1969).] 
24. HONSELL, supra note 2, at 14 and Maassen supra note 2, at 1474. 
25. See WeiB, supra note 2, at 608. 
26. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 323; Vogel, 10 Jahre sozialliberale Rechtspolitik, 1980 Z.F. RPOL 1, 2. 
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(4) The increasing number of lawyers probably also promotes the expansion 
of the legal field as well. Despite fears to the contrary, the increase in the number 
of professional legal graduates in the last few years has not yet led to any 
substantial employment problems. 27 Lawyers do not figure prominently in the 
unemployment rolls. This is, to be sure, based on the fact that legal education has 
long been the door to a multitude of careers, thus giving the graduate relatively 
great flexibility. Not a few young lawyers commence careers that have scarcely 
anything to do with applying the law. Still, a greatly increased number must seek 
genuine legal employment - and find it. This is mirrored in the increase in 
positions for judges in federal and state service28 as well as in the sharp increase 
in the number of practicing attorneys.29 It is clear that an increase in the 
importance society attaches to specifically legal components is linked with this 
increase in personnel. And a strong impulse toward the production of additional 
norms is sure to follow. Thus, the increase in the number of lawyers active in 
public administration in the last ten years has, of itself, led to a substantially 
greater production of draft statutes, draft regulations, ministerial releases, and 
so forth. 30 The growth of the ministerial bureaucracy is not only a result of, but a 
concurring cause of, the flood of norms. 
(5) The expectations of our society also make legal regulation increasingly 
necessary. Today the need to examine all of the decisions that touch us appears 
deeply rooted. No matter whether it concerns construction of a new highway, 
establishment of a new airport or the promotion of a student, whether it con-
cerns parental measures for the education of children, or the decision of the 
referee in a soccer match - everyone appears inclined not to accept the decision 
of another uncritically, but to have these decisions reviewed by an independent 
body for error or whim. The judicial system is, above all available as this neutral 
body; but it cannot enter the field unless decisions of all kinds are incorporated 
into a legal framework that will make it possible for courts to review them. The 
"legalization" of the school system offers a vivid example of this evolution. 
The expansion of the legal system is also driven onward by a growing orienta-
tion to the standard of equality. Wherever this maxim becomes the guiding 
27. The number of lawyers graduating went from 3,409 in 1970 to 4,926 in 1973, then gradually 
decreased to 3,763 in 1977. In 1975, a total of 1,349 lawyers was listed as unemployed. After a slight 
rise to 1,577 in 1976, the number declined to 1,180 in 1978. See 1 EMPFEHLUNGEN DES WIS-
SENSCHAFTSRATS ZUM NEUNTEN RAHMENPLAN FUR DEN HOCHSCHULBAU 115, 126 (1979). 
28. In the period from January 1, 1975, to January 1, 1979, the number of judges in land and federal 
service rose from 14,054 to 15,532 (STAT. JB 320 table 15.2 (1979». This represents an increase of 
10.52%. Using January 1, 1971, as a starting point (number of judges, 12,954, STAT.JB. 99 (1971» the 
increase is 19.9%. 
29. In the period from January 1, 1971, to January 1, 1979, the number of solicitors in the Federal 
Republic increased from 18,240 to 28,755 (STAT. JB 320, table 15.3 (1979», an increase of 57.65%. 
30. This is most true, of course, when the number and size of draft statutes serve as a badge of 
achievement for the department which drafts them, and as a basis for requests for new job positions 
during budgetary debates. See Maassen, supra note 2, at 1477. 
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principle of community life, legal explication of the preconditions and conse-
quences of social phenomena appears unavoidable. Equal treatment in equal 
situations can only be guaranteed effectively through appropriate norm-making. 
The less inequality a society will tolerate, the more law it requires. Putting equal 
opportunity into practice in the educational system provides an illustration of 
this. Substantial regulation has been necessary, for example, in the area of access 
to higher education, or to universities. Also symptomatic in this connection is 
the proposed replacement by a statutory enactment of the practice of pardoning 
when a life sentence is handed down. 
Greater demands for rational social development in such areas as environmen-
tal pollution and the use of earth resources or of new technology also place 
increased claims on the legal system. Instruments for future planning are re-
quired here, whose success can be guaranteed only if they are presented in the 
guise of statutes. 
The requirement for social security has a force at least as great in the expansion 
of legal rules. Effective material protection against all of the risks of life requires 
that society allow demands to be made on institutions capable of providing that 
protection. The web of social security is, therefore, of necessity, a web of norms. 
As the social web expands and solidifies, an increased production of norms 
automatically follows. The constant development of social legislation demon-
strates this, but also makes its proposed codification into a Social Law Code 
substantially more difficult. But the judicial development of the law of damages 
at the expense of the liability insurance companies belongs in this context as well. 
This leads to another viewpoint. The objective situation of our society will not 
allow for a fading away Qf the requirement for norms. The more crowded and 
risky community life is, the more obvious the importance of clear delimitation of 
the rights of individual members of society and the protection of their sphere of 
interest becomes. With great concentrations of people, such as exist everywhere 
in the Bundesrepublik (not only in the cities) and at today's level of technological 
development, a tight and effective control system for protecting the needs ofthe 
individual is indispensable. This is especially true when common understanding 
as a consensus for community living vanishes. 31 The dream of a society that can 
get by with a minimum of legal provisions may hold for the bucolic idylls of 
vanished cultures, but not for the vital problems of modern technical civiliza-
tions. The evolution of traffic laws, of data protection, or of products liability 
provides examples, selected at random, of some of these problems. 
There is also a requirement for regulation when scarce commodities are to be 
divided. The overflowing of rationing rules which took place in recent German 
history remains fresh in our memories. The present has, fortunately, substan-
tially freed us from this plague. Nevertheless, problems concerning the use of 
31. See Starck, supra note 2, at 212 . .In this sense, the increase in legal material can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the collapse of extra-legal norms of behavior. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 322. 
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limited resources still find their way into legal norms today. One need only 
remember the stipulations concerning the admission of students to universities, 
based on the activity of the Central Office in Dortmund. There is reason to 
suspect that, in other areas as well, the problem of rationing has not altogether 
vanished from the agenda of the legal order. 
IV. DANGERS OF THE DELUGE OF NORMS AND SOCIETAL COUNTER-REACTION 
To be sure, the flood of norms in our society in the meantime started a 
reaction which seems 1:0 presage a change in direction. When more closely 
observed, however, the suggested remedies scarcely appear calculated to have 
any sustained effect on the continued expansion of our legal order. The appeal 
to the legislature, for example, that it should carefully test the question of need 
before making any new legal initiatives may, perhaps, lead to a certain checking 
of the production of statutes. In many cases, however, such "legal self-
restraint"32 on the part of Parliament would only result in shifting the problem: 
the regulations the legislature abstained from making would then be developed 
by the courts or appear in the form of administrative rules.33 For the legal order 
as a whole, however, the form in which new norms appear is irrelevant. The 
refusal to promulgate new statutes would, therefore, hardly affect the quantity 
of additional legal provisions, but it would certainly affect their quality. Despite 
the entirely merited criticism of an occasional unfortunate statute, it is obvious 
that the legislative process generally leads to more considered and differentiated 
solutions than those reached by the courts, whose solutions are necessarily cut to 
fit far more concrete situations. At any rate, as opposed to the issuance of 
administrative rules, the passage of statutes has the advantage that the legal 
policy goals of the bureaucracy are subjected to legislative scrutiny. Besides, the 
use of the statutory form promotes the transparency of the legal order, whereas 
extra-statutory norms, such as judicial decisions or executive orders, may easily 
lead to an impenetrable thicket of legal provisions. 
This is not the place for detailed examination of the question of how legal 
norms ideally arise. No matter what the form in which the necessity for legal 
norms in our society is satisfied, a greater expansion of our legal order appears 
practically unavoidable in any case. It is the price which must be paid for striving 
for a social order which satisfies the legitimate needs of every citizen. This price 
is certainly not negligible. Developmental tendencies which could threaten the 
continued existence of a free society are bound up with the expansion of the 
legal system. 
32. This striking phrase is Maassen's, supra note 2. at 1476. [The phrase "legal self-restraint" is in English 
in the original.] 
33. For examples of such shifts. see Zweigert. supra note 2, at Kg; Vogel, supra note 2, at 324. Cj. 
Maassen. supra note 2. at 1478, who properly characterizes this as a mistaken development; similarly. 
Berner. supra note 2. at 624. 
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(1) Progressive legalization always has increased state action as a result. The 
mere production of legal rules is a sovereign act of state. Judicial control of their 
application leads to further increases in state duties. In many cases, the execution 
of regulations will also require the participation of public administrative au-
thorities [Behiirden]. Because of these facts, the rate of increase of the legal 
order means a further inflation in the number of government employees,34 
which leads in turn to an increase in the percentage of the gross national product 
expended by the government. Above all, however, the increase in the state 
percentage is the inevitable consequence of those statutes that lay new burdens 
on the whole of society in such areas as public health and public assistance. 
On the other hand, the increase in duties in the public sector is consistent with 
the disappearance of autonomous powers of self-regulation in the society. A 
state that guarantees the well-being of all citizens by means of a tight network of 
regulations leaves insufficient space for the development of private beneficence. 
The discussion concerning the most recent reform of family law in the area of 
parental rights and duties has also made clear the reciprocal effect of an increase 
in law, coupled with a weakening of the independence of the family.35 
(2) The promulgation of legal rules is often connected with a fixing of the 
current state of social development. Because of rapid social change, quite a few laws 
are obsolete at the very moment when, after extensive parliamentary debates, 
they enter into force. The law then becomes an obstacle, preventing necessary 
reforms and adaptations. The German law with respect to universities affords a 
current example of the loss of flexibility which results from statutes that are 
quickly out-of-date.36 
To be sure, a good part of our increased production of norms is to be ascribed 
to amending legislation or judicial lawmaking which attempts to adjust an-
tiquated provisions as necessary to fit current social conditions. But no one 
should form an exaggerated idea of the possibilities for correction here. In 
general, years, if not decades, pass before an overdue reform of antiquated 
statutes can be completed, whether legislatively or judicially. A too rapid fluctua-
tion in regulations in force could also lead to a critical loss of trust in the certainty 
of the law. The discussion of the flood of statutes has warned us of precisely this 
point;37 it is possible that in the future the legislature will exercise even greater 
restraint in effecting legal reform because of it. But, at the same time, this would 
increase the retarding effect of the laws already in force, which stands in the way 
of the free evolution of society. In such a case, relief could be expected only from 
34. See Berner, supra note 2, at 621; Maassen, supra note 2, at 1476. 
35. See Diederichsen, Die Neuregelung der elterlichen Sorge, 1980, NJW 1. 
36. See Hochschulrahmengesetz of January 26, 1976, BGBL I, 185 and numerous state statutes 
enacted in accordance with it. 
37. Berner, supra note 2, at 620. 
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the judiciary which has, in the past, played a substantial part in the moderniza-
tion of our legal order. 
(3) This leads to another problem. An expansion of the legal order is automat-
ically connected to an increase in the legal competence of the judiciary which 
must apply, interpret and develop legal provisions. Especially when laws are full 
of loopholes, are "blanket norms" or general provisions, the judiciary is left 
considerable room for the development of its own ideas of order. The difficulty 
with this development lies not only with the oft-lamented perversion of the 
Rechtstaat into a state in which the courts, rather than the parliament and the 
government, make the major governing decisions (justizstaat).38 More important 
than the shifting of the constitutionally mandated division of powers is the fact 
that the judiciary thereby acquires powers that lie outside its professional compe-
tence. It is enough to remember the example of the peaceful use of atomic 
energy to make this problem clear. In fact, the administrative courts have, in the 
last ten years, often had to pronounce the last word on exceedingly complicated 
technological developments. They were no better prepared for this than their 
professional training and practice would allow. That they could often count on 
the collaboration of experts is small consolation. The translation of legal ques-
tions into technical language is itself linked with substantial sources of error 
which even the most qualified judge cannot fully master. 
Similar problems arise when ajudiciary inadequately supported by the legisla-
ture must "switch tracks" by making fundamental decisions of principle in 
important social and political disputes; the federal labor court has been called 
upon to do so over and over again. The courtroom and the judge's chambers are 
not the right place to reach satisfactory solutions to social conflicts of far-
reaching significance. After all, the chances for obtaining exact information 
about the underlying social conditions are insufficiently developed in the context 
of court proceedings. They are far less substantial than those sources of informa-
tion available to parliament when it passes a statute. In addition, the spectrum of 
interests is often insufficiently revealed by the adversary scheme of trial. Particu-
lar problems are also created by the difficulty of controlling the social outcome of 
judicial decisions. To be sure, parliament, too, checks on the actual results of its 
lawmaking only in an extremely incomplete fashion. 39 But the judiciary must, in 
a practical sense, leave reports on the success of the norms developed by it to 
chance. 
(4) The increasing "legalization" of our society also results in the destruction of 
so-called lawJree spaces. 40 This cannot be grasped quantitatively, since there is no 
exact inventory available of those fields the legal order has spared. Legal schol-
38. See WeiB, supra note 2, at 602. 
39. See Maassen, supra note 2, at 1477. 
40. For a description of law free spaces, see COMES, DER RECHTSFREIE RAUM (1976); English, Der 
rechtsfreie Raum, 1952 ZGESSTAATSW 385; Kaufmann, Rechtsfreier Raum und eigenverantwortliche 
Entscheidung, in FESTSCHRIFT MAURACH 327 (1972). 
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arship, in accordance with its tasks, concerns itself only with the positive sub-
stance of legal material, not with the negative reverse image of law-free space. 
For us, this area is still largely terra incognita. Measuring it exactly may also be 
impossible because there can be but few areas of life into which the law has not 
penetrated at all. As examples of this one could, of course, identify purely 
mental events such as thoughts, moods, feelings, opinions or religious beliefs.41 
But the general forms of social intercourse often named in the same context 
have, at least when the blunders are gross, become subject to law, for example, in 
the matter of insult. The example demonstrates that the concept of a law-free 
space is essentially relative. In general, the question is not whether a certain area 
is exempted from the rule of law but whether the laws governing it are strong or 
weak in intensity. The expansion of the law is, therefore, accomplished less by its 
movement into social domains hitherto without legal norms, and more by a 
constantly tightening web of rules. This can be seen in the most recent new 
regulation of the consequences of divorce within the framework of so-called 
equalization of benefits. 42 
It is clear that the gradual filling of law-free spaces can result in limitations on 
human freedom to act.43 To be sure, law often takes the place of extra-legal 
norms of behavior which have lost their binding force. Thus, a disintegration of 
the morality of the marketplace has required the intervention of the law in such 
areas as competition and consumer protection. In such cases, only a change in 
the form in which social norms appear in our society lies behind the expansion of 
the legal order. Such a change in form can, however, result in a substantial 
impoverishment of ethical standards: after awhile the citizen views the standards 
set by the law as the ordinary measure of human conduct. The far-reaching 
"legalization" of welfare work has possibly resulted in a gradual collapse of 
private philanthropy as a standard for social behavior: "the poor are referred to 
the public dole."44 
In other respects, the liberty restricting aspects of a legal order that is con-
stantly expanding are thoroughly ambiguous. One of the last law-free spaces in 
traffic regulation is the lack of a general speed limit on the autobahns. Here 
society has hitherto successfully managed to preserve its freedom of action - but 
the price paid can be gathered from the accident statistics. One needs to con-
41. See !.ARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 355 (1979); CANARIS, DIE FESTSTELLUNG 
VON LiicKEN 1M GESETZ 40 (1964). 
42. [FOT a discussion of the concept of "equalization of benefits" and its consequences in divorce, see 
M. RHE1VSTE1V & M. GLEVDOV, Intcrspousal Relations, 4 I.VT'L EVCYCLOPEDH OF COI,fP. L. II2 
(A. Chloros, ed. 1980)). 
43. Wei6 is most forcible on this point. Wei6, supra note 2, at 604. 
44. This conjecture receives empirical support from a study prepared by the Institut fUr Demoskopie 
Allensbach, DIE STELLVNG DER FREIEN WOHLFAHRTSPFLEGE 40, 55 (1979), which is based on four 
representative popUlation surveys made between 1962 and 1979. According to this study, the willing-
ness to volunteer for welfare work has declined steadily since 1962. 
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sider, too, that a series of new laws is often directly intended to guarantee the 
freedom of the individual by regulating such areas as data protection, for 
example, or inquiries on the part of intelligence services. Here the primary focus 
is on limiting the liberty of the state in favor of the liberty of the citizen. Who 
would care to dissuade the legislature from this? Liberty may be threatened not 
only by the presence of laws, but by the lack of them. The amount of freedom a 
society preserves is less a result of the number of its laws than of their content. 
The previous discussion of the flood of laws has allowed this to be somewhat 
forgotten. 
(5) We may take heart from yet another circumstance. The law is endangering 
its own effectiveness as it continues to grow in volume. The flood of norms has 
led to an as yet unresolved "crisis of information." The legal profession itself 
must often grapple with substantial difficulties when it tries to discover the law in 
force with respect to a particular case. Now more than ever, the great mass of 
legal innovations passes by the rest of the members of society without leaving a 
trace. For this reason, the law probably plays no prominent part even today in 
the average citizen's conception of the world. There may, of course, be a rude 
awakening when a house is to be bought, or even built, when a marriage runs 
into trouble, when one has too many moving traffic violations, or when the 
revenue service orders an audit. But aside from such critical situations, the vast 
majority of men manage to go through long periods of their lives avoiding any 
conscious confrontation with the legal system and its representatives. Fear of the 
freedom threatening aspects of an excess of law rests, thus, at least in part, on an 
exaggerated belief in the law's social importance.45 From the standpoint of 
public policy, an imperfectly effective legal system is certainly to be regretted. It 
is, nonetheless, paradoxically the foundation for the fact that an overregulation 
of our lives in society through the flood of norms cannot take place. 
Translated by]. Lee Riccardi 
45. For more on this point, see NOLL, GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE 146 (1973); Heidrich, Moglichkeiten und 
Grenzen der Sozialgestaltung dUTCh gesetzgeberische Maftnahmen, in 2 LE NUOVE FRONTIERE DEL DIRITTO E LA 
PROBLEMA DELL'UNIFICAZIONE 531 (1979). 
